공유자원의 자율관리에 관한 연구 : 영광ㆍ무안 어촌계의 제도론적 분석을 중심으로

Abstract

This study is to verify the possibility of self-governing administration in fishing village community Cholanam-do, excluding the direct intervention of government using Ostrom's IAD Framework and institution design principles and to suggest the effective utilization of the provincial development model. The case of Ya-wol and Gye-ma fishing village community, the investigated communities, was very successful in situational combination of the systems for the maintenance , controling and utilizing of costal fishery area. The success could be attributed to the adequate applications of the principles to the community attributes. But it can not be sufficient that they simply have the practical ownership for the fishery area. The absence of maintenance and control in common-pool resources, the passive attitudes of the community people and difficulties due to the community attributes were making it difficult that they have the self-control in the use of common-pool resources. For the details, it can be summarized as follows. First, the government has guaranteed the making and enforcement of the principles, thereby, they fulfill 'the Institutional Principle 7' and the most coastal fishery areas are using 'the closed CPR' with the clearly defined boundaries in the fulfillment of 'the IP 1' Secondly, the IP 2, prescribing that the principles are to be coincident with the areal situation of the communities, is applied in the Ya-wol, Ok-sil and Gye-ma village community, but partially in Doo-u. Thirdly, the establishment and accommodation in self-regulating principles in the communities Ya-wol, Ok-sil, Doo-U and Ma-Dong are made with the agreement of all members of the communities who have the opportunities in participation. thereby, this is for the IP 3. Fourthly, the IP 4, prescribing the existence of the monitoring mechanism for fair using of common-pool resources, is applied in Ya-wol, Gye-ma and Ma-dong, but not in Ok-sil and Doo-U. For the fifth, the IP 5, prescribing the establishment of the gradual sanction mechanism for the violating the operating rules, is applied in Gye-ma, but not in the others above. The Ma-dong community has the mechanism, but the practicing the rules is not sufficient in accordance with the codification, thereby it means the partial practicing of the mechanism. For the sixth, there have been some cases of complications in the communities mentioned above. But they don't have the conflict resolution system. This is against 'the IP 6' prescribing there should be the conflict resolution mechanism. Lastly, concerning the community attributes, in Ya-wol, Gye-ma, they have easy way to the cooperation through the powerful community leadership and their active and voluntary participation, thereby it can be possible for them to have their own fishery area in control for the preservation of resources. On the other hand, in such areas, they have a lot of difficulty solving the problems accompanied with the usage, maintenance and control. This is caused by very indifferent and formal attitude due to the low income from the fishery. For the possibility of the coexistence of the governmental and the self-regulatory successful management of the common-pool resources through the informal self-regulation implies as followings. First, self-regulatory management rules play a great role in the utilization of common-pool resources, thereby it is recommended that they promote the self-regulatory method and transfer the control to the communities. And it is desirable to make various kinds of model in terms of the community attributes, decision-making rules, the physical and social range of the participation and the way to utilize. Secondly, we came to theoretically verify the decision-making process influenced not only by the formal rules, but also by the informal factors. Thirdly, social phenomenon is the rules coined by the interaction of the members under the formal and informal regulation, thereby for the better understanding of the social phenomenon, we need to get across the interaction between the community and its members. For the fourth, assuming that the communities could have their common-pool resources under control efficiently, the government is recommended to make more self-regulatory and motivational system to set out the more voluntary participation without direct intervening in the dealing with the common-pool resources. For the fifth, the government needs to make more flexible approaches for the control in the dealing with the common-pool resources related with the very interest of the community people. In this study, it is clear that the government is providing the opportunity to deal with the complications in managing the common-pool resources and the coastal fishery area in their own control, improving the water quality in coastal fishery area to some degree, suggesting guidelines to keep the resources from being drained. And that the government is approaching in the way to give the opportunity to participate in the settlement of common-pool resource complication and make it on community people's own. This fact suggests there could be some changes in the role of government and its function in this issue : if there's a practical will and ability, the government can transfer the right and responsibility for the whole management so as to control over on their own. And lastly, through this study, it was verified that the most effective factor of all is the powerful leadership and that the more intimacy and cohesion they have, the more respect for the rules they have in the community and also the more efficiency they can keep in preserving the resources in fishery area. Also, that the more cooperative interaction between the community members in the project they make, the more powerful role-playing the community leader could practice.