북한 비핵화 과정의 기술적 검증 적용방안에 관한 연구

Abstract

ABSTRACT

A Study on the Application of Technical Verification for Denuclearization Process in North Korea

Moon, Sung Joon Advisor : Prof. Kim, Beob Heon, Ph.D. Department of Military Science Graduate School of Chosun University

The purpose of this study is to explore the technical verification aspects of systematically identifying all nuclear programs which including nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities and delivery means, and their application in the process of achieving the North Korea denuclearization. Since North Korea's nuclear issue began to be known to the international community in the early 1990s, the South and North Korea parties, as well as the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and the U.N. and the IAEA, have made a lot of efforts to achieve North Korea's denuclearization but failed as a result. There will be various causes and backgrounds, but most diplomatic and security experts analyzed that the biggest reason for the North’s failure to denuclearize was that it failed to pass the "wall of verification," and predicted that the biggest difficulty in achieving the North’s denuclearization in the future is "verification." In studying the technical verification of North Korea's nuclear program, I started with the following awareness of the problem: First, what obstacles and difficulties have been in the process of pushing for the denuclearization of North Korea over the past three decades? Second, what factors affect the verification of North Korea's denuclearization? Third, what is the effective application of technical verification? From these problems, the focus of research was placed on the technical area among the political and technical areas of verification. The political and technical aspects of verification are complementary and inseparable. Through the development of verification technology, the means and methods for nuclear verification can be diversified to facilitate political negotiations and responses, thereby facilitating trust relations among treaty parties. This study has focused on the research of the technical area of verification that has been lacking in research rather than on political aspects with relatively many research results. On this study, we analyzed in terms of technical verification using the framework of criteria which has the theoretical background of the theory of denuclearization and verification deemed useful in the denuclearization of North Korea. Based on the case analysis of Libya's nuclear verification case, the North's failed nuclear verification process over the past 30 years was analyzed from a technical verification perspective and problems were drawn out and the technical verification application method was presented to be applied to the North's denuclearization process in the future. Three small independent variables of technical verification were considered to be subject to verification, means of verification and methods of verification. First, verification means were divided into National Technical Means(NTM), Multinational Technical Means(MTM), international organizations, and verification organizations, and verification methods were divided into monitoring, inspection, sampling and analysis, and the subject to verification were classified into nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities, and deliveries of nuclear weapon. We considered that the verification means affect decisions about the subjects of verification, and the subjects of verification mutually affect the choice of the verification means. We also assumed that the verification method affects the choice of the subjects of verification, and the subjects of verification interacts with the application of the verification method. We assumed that in technical verification, as the verification process progresses, three small independent variables of the subjects of verification, the means of verification and the verification method affect each other. If the elements that make up the technical verification work organically and complement each other, it could lead to higher chances of the North's denuclearization and, on the other hand, lower chances of achieving the North's denuclearization if it doesn't work well. From this study, we were able to derive significant findings on technical verification as follows. First, this paper provided a fundamental and objective answer to the cause of the failure of North Korea's denuclearization process for more than three decades. The crucial point of the breakdown of North Korea's denuclearization was the verification issue. North Korea's denuclearization was bound to fail because North Korea had never acknowledged the technical verification results by monitoring, inspection and scientific scrutiny, and rejected to give further clarification by the international community on the allegations. Second, this paper provided criteria and direction to the subject of verification, the priority of verification, and access to effective verification means and methods through technical analysis of North Korea's nuclear program. It is believed that the technical assessment of the verification priority has provided criteria for verification means and methods by checking exactly what the verification targets are to achieve North Korea's denuclearization. Third, the paper confirmed that the more effective national technical means(NTM) and multi-national technical means(MTM) are used in accordance with the development of science and technology, the more information imbalances can be addressed in the implementation of nuclear verification. Monitoring by satellites, which are products of technological development, allowing aerial reconnaissance to be conducted without a human being due to the opening of the airspace, and the use of multi-domain surveillance and detection equipment in the underground & ground, sea and air will enable the acquisition of information on the verification of North Korea's nuclear weapons to be easily achieved. Monitoring by satellites, which are products of technological development, allowing aerial reconnaissance to be conducted with or without a human being due to the opening of the airspace, and the use of surveillance and detection equipment in the ground, sea and air will enable the acquisition of information on the verification of North Korea's nuclear so that these help to be easily achieved of the purpose of the verification. Fourth, this paper confirmed that it was possible to verify that various technical methods were applied to the monitoring, on-site inspection, sampling and analysis methods in nuclear verification to dispel mutual misunderstanding and distrust and achieve confidence building. In the Libya's nuclear verification, various verification methods were applied to achieve nuclear and missile dismantlement and denuclearization. On the other hand, for the verification of North Korea's nuclear program, the international community was failed to properly apply technical verification methods such as monitoring, on-site inspections, sampling and analysis methods so that it was failed to verify its nuclear program. The implications of this study are as follows. First, this study looked at denuclearization verification cases on the basis of verification theories based on the theory of denuclearization and the theory of verification based on arms control and attempted to apply them to verification of North Korea's denuclearization. Many studies have been done on the theory of denuclearization and arms control, and proving the theory through actual case studies on it, but there has been little evidence of the theory of verification through the study of verification and the actual case studies of it. Second, this is the first study to attempt a study of technical verification. Most of the research involved general processes and analyses on verification, research on verification issues in nuclear negotiations, and effective verification strategies for the denuclearization in North Korea. but this paper is the only one that has studied technical evaluation and verification methods for the entire North Korean nuclear program. Third, the research was done by linking scientific and technological fields to sociological research. Existing studies have taken a largely political approach to verification and ended with an analysis from a view of it. In this study, we tried to incorporate scientific thinking and analysis to prove objective facts and theories in terms of the verification process, verification subject, verification means, and verification methods, which are the most important aspects of North Korea's denuclearization. Fourth, the research on technological verification is a research product that can actually contribute to realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula by carrying out mutually reliable verification by applying it to the Korean Peninsula in the future. I believe that North Korea's denuclearization without verification is nothing more than verbal entertainment. It is expected that academic research can be used in the process of verifying North Korea's nuclear program by agreeing in principle to negotiate the denuclearization of North Korea. The limitations and future directions of research are listed below. First, this study began with the assumption that the biggest hurdle to achieving North Korea's denuclearization was the verification field. I failed to consider and include all the various arguments because the study assumed the most dominant and difficult challenges in achieving the denuclearization of Nuclear Korea have been limited to the areas of verification. Thus, I hope that there will be studies that will not only affect verification but also include all of them. Second, I believe that there has been insufficient research on the technical and political areas of verification. Verification is a process of intersecting political and technological domains. Moreover, given that diplomatic, economic and sociocultural situations and factors clearly influence verification, this study of the technical verification field may be the result of studies on limited areas. Therefore, I hope that in the future, there will be a series of studies demonstrating the verification theory by incorporating technical, political, diplomatic, economic and sociocultural factors that affect verification. Third, it was very difficult to collect objective information to make a technical assessment of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and to materialize technical verification targets, means and methods. It is true that specific information on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs is an area of military security and that it is difficult to trust objectively with the North's unilateral announcement and assertion alone. In this context, I hope that future access to military information will be the starting point for the people's right to know, to some extent, to come together to find an alternative solution to the problem.

Key Words : Denuclearization, Technical Verification, Verification Theory, National & Multinational Technical Means, On-Site Inspection, Monitoring & Interpretation, Analysis.