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북한 핵정책에 관한 연구 : 전략과 협상

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Author(s)
이명찬
Issued Date
2006
Abstract
This thesis is written out for the research of the North Korean's nuclear policy authority. Therefore, this thesis studies the following matters.
First, this thesis will study strategy and contents of the North Korea's nuclear issue and the first and second North Korea's nuclear crisis. Second, it will study transitions, significances, and limitations of International ententes to settle the nuclear issue, including the Geneva entente and the Six-party meeting. Third, it will study the influences to the International relationships and prospects of the North Korea's nuclear issue.
The research's result of these questions could be summarized following ways.The North Korea's nuclear policy had the duplicity.To be appeared on the outside, they claim Nuclear pacifism but on the inside, they tried to get the nuclear weapon. The North Korea's nuclear policy has been obscure. The North Korea decided the United States as the nuclear entente after seceding from NPT.The North Korea has kept obscure to get the maximum values from being the Nuclear armed and it enabled their policy from being the nuclear armed to negotiating with the United States from late 1991.The North Korea's policy which acquires political, economical, and national security aims as being obscure about the Nuclear arm is not reasonable but it could be rational.
In the second North Korea's nuclear crisis, the North Korea had to deal with the South Korea, the United States of America, China, Japan, Russia, UN and IAEA.This circumstance realized that the North Korea needs to rearrange the policy decision methods.This shows that the North Korea also tries to be suited to its circumstance just like other countries do.
The North Korea's policy strategy for the nuclear issue can be explained in four categories of conflict structure.First, the North Korea applies China for his support against the mutual assistance of the South Korea and the United States of America. Second, the North Korea rationalized that its extreme behavior such as the secession from NPT and IAEA is caused by the injustice and irrationality of the agreement and organization.Third, the North Korea refuses to negotiate with South Korea about the Nuclear issue but they pursue the direct negotiation with the United States of America in the first Nuclear crisis. Fourth, even though the South Korea and the United States of America pursues the Nuclear issue with technical and normative methods, the North Korea pursues the Nuclear issue politically.The Joint statement of the Six-party meeting is the outcome of the North Korea (from being Nuclear armed to Nuclear negotiation for profits) and the United States of America's (from the hard line to seeking for agreement) policy change.
The North Korea's nuclear policy authority lowered the mutual distrust between the South and North Korea for the accommodation, exchanges, and cooperations between two countries.All effort for the peaceful settlement between two countries they have made after 1990s developed than before.Since the South Korea has to prepare for the North Korea's Nuclear weapon, both countries try to be armed as heavy as possible.The mutual agreement between the South Korea and the United States of America would be continuously maintained but the Joint statement is taken by the ambassador amity level therefore, the mutual agreement between the South Korea and the United States of America acquires the newer and deeper settlement.
In the future, the prospect of the North Korea's nuclear policy authority is analyzed by three alternative plans such as a continuance, abandonment, and reservation of the Nuclear development. In a short term, the reservation of the Nuclear development might be the alternative plan because of an economical difficulty, food shortage, transitional period after the death of Kim, Il-Sung and diplomatic isolation. In a long term, they endeavor to maximize their security profit, political and economical reward within the Joint statement.The North Korea's questioning attitude for the Nuclear issue wouldn't be changed either the alternative plans.
And the prospective strategy of North Korea's nuclear policy will appear to be the request for the United States of America's fulfilling and the strategy of uncertainty. If this condition persists longer, North Korea will be recognized as the latent holder of Nuclear weapons by the surrounding nations. If so, they can maintain the usefulness of nuclear.
In a conclusion, the Joint statement of the Six-party meeting is not the termination of the Nuclear weapon but the another beginning. If the Joint statement settles the North Korea's nuclear issue and guarantees the certainty of the nuclear weapon, it is nothing but a wishful thinking.Alternative plans to terminate the North Korea's nuclear and settle the peace between North and South Korea would be the research and better negotiation of the North Korea's nuclear policy authority, the policy change to the United States of America, and the counter-movement between the North Korea and the United States of America's agreement.The research should be continuously accomplished not only the subject derived from the nuclear issues but the reinforcement of armaments.
Alternative Title
A Study on North Korea's Nuclear Policy : Strategy and Negotiations
Alternative Author(s)
Lee, Myung Chan
Affiliation
조선대학교 대학원
Department
일반대학원 정치외교학과
Advisor
오수열
Awarded Date
2006-02
Table Of Contents
ABSTRACT
제1장 서론 = 1
제1절 연구의 목적 = 1
제2절 연구의 범위 및 방법 = 3
제2장 핵정책 연구의 이론적 논의 = 5
제1절 이론적 배경 = 5
제2절 선행연구 = 13
제3절 분석 틀 = 18
제3장 북한 핵정책의 전개 과정 = 20
제1절 북한 핵 개발과 제1차 핵위기 = 20
1. 북한 핵개발의 전개 = 20
2. 제1차 북핵위기 = 32
제2절 북한 핵 전략과 제2차 핵위기 = 48
1. 북미관계와 북한 전략 = 48
2. 제2차 북핵위기 = 59
제4장 북핵 협상 = 73
제1절 제네바 협상 = 73
1. 제네바 협상 내용 = 73
2. 제네바 합의의 의미와 한계 = 81
제2절 베이징 회담 = 84
1. 3자회담 = 84
2. 6자회담 = 87
제5장 북한 핵정책의 영향과 전망 = 104
제1절 영향 = 104
1. 한반도 주변관계 = 104
2. 남북관계 = 131
제2절 전망 = 136
1. 핵개발 지속 = 136
2. 핵개발 유보 = 138
제6장 결론 = 142
참고문헌 = 148
Degree
Doctor
Publisher
조선대학교 대학원
Citation
이명찬. (2006). 북한 핵정책에 관한 연구 : 전략과 협상.
Type
Dissertation
URI
https://oak.chosun.ac.kr/handle/2020.oak/6158
http://chosun.dcollection.net/common/orgView/200000232931
Appears in Collections:
General Graduate School > 4. Theses(Ph.D)
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