IPO 기업의 이익조정이 상장폐지에 미치는 영향

Abstract

According to the previous literature, it is argued that the conceptual effect of reducing the discretion of managers with the introduction of principle-based accounting standards mainly occurs in the information environment where regulations and market monitoring are strict. From a similar point of view, this study confirms whether upward earnings management in the year of IPO increases the probability of delisting, and examines whether the relationship between earnings management and delisting of IPO firms differs between the K-GAAP and IFRS adoption periods. On average, the IPO year is characterized by stricter regulations and market monitoring than other periods as pre-listing examinations, institutional demand forecasting, and lock-up period are applied. If the effect of reducing managerial discretion due to the introduction of principle-based IFRS occurs under strict regulations and market monitoring, the probability that upward earnings management in the year of IPO will result in delisting will be relatively reduced in the period of adoption of IFRS than in K-GAAP. In order to verify this prediction, we select IPO firms newly listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets from 2001 to 2015 as a sample and empirically analyze the hypothesis. The analysis results are summarized as follows. First, we confirm that the probability of being delisted within 5 years after IPO increases as discretionary accrual in the year of IPO increases. Second, in the K-GAAP application period, we find a positive relationship between discretionary accrual in the year of IPO and delisting. However, the increase in discretionary accrual in the IFRS period do not increase the probability of delisting. These results imply that upward earnings management does not reflect agency risk when IFRS are applied in IPO years with strict regulatory and market monitoring. Overall, our results suggest that the introduction of principle-based accounting standards in an information environment with strict regulations and market monitoring is having a conceptual effect of reducing managerial discretion.