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강대국에 대한 약소국의 역강압전략에 관한 연구 : 북핵 문제를 중심으로

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Author(s)
정종관
Issued Date
2016
Keyword
Coercion, Counter-Coercion, Coercive Diplomacy, Great Powers, Weak States, NPT, IAEA, DPRK’s Nuclear
Abstract
ABSTRACT

A Study on the North Korea’s Reverse-Coercion
Strategy against Powerful Nations
-Focusing on DPRK’s Nuclear Issue-

Jeong, Jong-Kwan
Adviser:Prof, Oh, Soo-Yol, Ph. D.
Department of Political Science and Diplomacy
The Graduate School of Chosun University

Military value of possessing nuclear weapons has been noticed with the fact that it becomes a major cause of incapacitating conventional system. The strategic value of nuclear weapons for the minor nations or terrorist groups appears that it is a useful measure to appeal their will to hostile countries. Therefore forces willing to possess the nuclear weapon have tried every means possible in developing and obtaining the nuclear power at all costs. The reason is, by possessing a nuclear weapon, a country can protect, maintain, and ensure its core interests from counter forces. Eventually, nuclear weapons are used as the best means when expanding influence through achieving political and strategic edge rather than when considering its military means.

By possessing nuclear weapon, North Korean government looks forward to ensure its core interest of regime preservation through the conflict with US. To solve North Korea’s nuclear problems, various consensus have been made with the international societies and organizations formed around the US. But by using process and duration of consensus fulfillment, North Korea is raising its negotiation power through upgrade of nuclear capacity on the premise of peaceful use of nuclear. This made the US government to induce a hard line against North Korea and North Korea is opposing to US by choosing the reverse-coercion strategy. It shows an evidence that weak nation like North Korea can also stay in balanced state with powerful country like US if it possesses nuclear weapons.

Besides making conflict with US, North Korea government tried to possess nuclear deterrence as a measure to solidify its regime by shifting internal problems to exterior area and intensify the offensive against South Korea. The period from nuclear development step to the 1st North Korea nuclear crisis, North Korea formed the basis of nuclear development, under stable regime of the late Kim Il Sung, The symptoms of nuclear development was exposed, but it did not draw attention from international society. But after July, 1994, as Kim Il Sung died and Kim Jeong Il appeared, substantial North Korea’s nuclear crisis began. Kim Jeong Il was a prepared leader who used a long duration of the hereditary succession of power. However, due to sudden death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jeong Il needed a special measures to solidify his authority at early stage. So Kim Jeong Il upgraded nuclear deterrence to show off his authority and solidify internal regime unity. Also Kim Jeong Il tried to achieve ‘Self- defense in National defense’ in military field of North Korea’s ‘juche’ ideology by an epoch-making enhancement of military strength. In economic field, Kim Jeong Il made “it” an opportunity to complete ‘Keeping pace in economics and national defense’. Through this action, Kim Jeong Il wanted to prove that his authority follows the late Kim Il Sung’s injunctions pursuing legitimacy of baekdoo blood. And also wanted to overcome the vulnerable period of the hereditary succession of power, by defusing tension and crisis in the Korean Peninsula. And after overcoming vulnerable period, they tried to achieve unification by communists in Korean Peninsula.

Kim Jeong Eun, the 1st Chairman is also following his father’s footsteps in concern of nuclear deterrence development. But because of unprepared hereditary succession of power, the cycle is shortened, unveiled and show irregular state to an extent of unpredictability. In political, strategic aspect, Kim Jeong Eun tried to carve a perception that he owns a global leadership to North Korean people, by gaining economic interest through conflict with US.

In such situation, US normalized hostile relationship with Cuba, and accomplished diplomatic result exchanging freezing of nuclear program and removal of economic sanctions through conversation and compromise. However North Korean government witnessed US invading Iraq and learned a important lesson that they must possess nuclear deterrence for their regime maintenance. Because North Korea’s nuclear program is a core measure for regime maintenance, national security, and economic restoration. It is the key purpose for North Korea to induce conflict with US using nuclear deterrence.

North Korea won’t give up the nuclear program unless the whole national security anxiety is resolved such as international isolation, economic recession, and threat from US. For last 60 years, North Korea has developed nuclear weapon and has boasted preparation to use it whenever and wherever. Since 9·11 terror, proclamation of war against terror, prevention of enormous killing weapon and spread of democracy is fundamental diplomatic defense strategy. The conflict has been triggered between US and North Korea since US cannot just watch North Korea’s nuclear development. Also China and Russia are expressing direct objection as North Korea’s nuclear development does not coincide with their national benefits. If North Korea keep induces conflicts and try actions trying to make 9·19joint declaration and 2․13consensus invalid, US can replace North Korean government officially through cooperation or military strength by international society.

Solving North Korea’s nuclear deterrence problem is a shortcut to resolving ROK’s security threats and increasing core national interests. If North Korea pursues innovation and open policy, North Korea will be accepted as a member of international society with a promise of positive economic and political support which will enable North Korea to operate as a normal country. Concerning ROK and North Korea, if promises made in 7·4joint communique, ‘independence, peace, nation union’, are carried out, a basis to achieve peaceful unity in Korean Peninsula will be provided.

Key Words:Coercion, Counter-Coercion, Coercive Diplomacy, Great Powers, Weak States, NPT, IAEA, DPRK’s Nuclear| 핵무기 보유의 군사적 가치는 재래식 무기체계의 효용성을 무력화 시키는 원인으로 작용하고 있다. 전략적 가치는 약소국이나 테러집단 등으로 확산되었을 경우 적대국에게 자신들의 의지를 강요하는데 매우 유용한 수단으로 등장하였다. 따라서 핵무기를 보유하려는 세력들은 희생을 감수하면서 핵무기를 획득하거나 개발하는데 총력을 기울이고 있다. 왜냐하면 핵무기를 보유함으로써 적대세력으로부터 자국의 핵심이익에 대한 보호·유지·확보가 가능하기 때문이다. 결국 핵무기는 군사적 의미보다는 정치적·외교적·전략적 우위 달성을 통한 영향력을 확대하는 최고의 수단으로 이용되고 있다.

북한 정권은 핵 억지력 보유함으로써 미국과의 갈등 유발을 통해 체제유지라는 핵심 국익을 확보하고자 한다. 북 핵 문제를 해결하기 위하여 미국을 중심으로 하는 국제사회와 국제기구들은 다양한 합의를 이끌어 냈다. 그러나 합의 이행과정과 기간을 이용하여 핵의 평화적 이용이라는 전제를 앞세워 핵 능력을 고도화시켜 협상력을 높여가고 있다. 이는 미국으로 하여금 대북 강압전략을 채택 하였고 북한 정권은 역강압전략을 채택하며 맞대응 하고 있다. 약소국인 북한도 핵 억지력을 보유하면 세계 최강국인 미국과 맞대응 할 수 있다는 증거를 보여주고 있다.

북한 정권은 미국과의 갈등유발 외에도 내부적인 문제를 외부로 전가하여 체제를 공고화 하거나 대남공세를 위한 수단으로서의 핵 억지력을 보유 하고자 하였다. 핵 개발 단계로부터 1차 북 핵 위기 시 까지는 김일성 주석의 공고한 체제하에서 핵 개발에 대한 기반을 조성하였다. 핵 개발 징후가 노출되었지만 국제사회로부터 관심도가 높지 않았다. 그러나 1994년 7월 김일성이 사망한 이후 김정일이 등장하면서 실질적인 북 핵 위기가 시작되었다. 김정일은 장기간에 걸친 권력세습 기간을 이용한 준비된 지도자였다. 그러나 김일성 주석의 갑작스러운 사망으로 인해 조기에 권력 공고화를 위한 특단의 대책이 필요하였다. 이를 위해 개발 중이던 핵 억지력을 고도화시킴으로써 세습 권력을 과시하며 내부 체제결속을 공고화 하고자 하였다. 또한 군사력의 획기적인 증강을 통하여 주체사상의 군사 분야인 ‘국방에서의 자위’를 달성하고자 하였다. 경제 분야에서는 ‘핵 경제 병진노선’을 완성할 수 있는 계기로 삼았다. 이를 통하여 김일성 주석의 유훈을 이어 받은 백두혈통의 정통성과 정당성을 추구하는 권력임을 증명하고자 하였다. 또한 한반도에서의 긴장과 위기를 조성하여 권력 세습기간 동안의 안보 취약기를 극복하고자 하였다. 그리고 안보 취약기가 해소된 이후에는 한반도의 공산화통일을 달성하고자 하였다.

김정은 제1위원장도 핵 억지력 개발과 관련하여 아버지 김정일 국방위원장의 행태를 그대로 답습하고 있다. 다만 준비되지 않은 상태에서의 권력 세습으로 인하여 시간적 측면에서는 그 주기가 단축되고 공개적 이며 예측이 불가능할 정도의 불규칙한 행태를 보이고 있다. 정치적·전략적 측면에서는 미국과 갈등을 유발함으로써 경제적 국익을 획득하여 김정은 자신이 글로벌 리더십의 소유자임을 북한 인민에게 각인시키고자 하였다.

미국은 쿠바와 국교 정상화, 이란과는 핵 프로그램 동결과 경제제재 해제를 맞바꾸는 외교적 성과를 이루어냈다. 그러나 북한 김정은 정권은 미국의 이라크 침공을 목도하고 체제생존을 목적으로 핵 억지력을 보유해야 한다는 중요한 교훈을 얻게 되었다. 왜냐하면 북한의 핵 프로그램은 체제유지와 안전보장, 그리고 경제회복을 위한 생존수단의 유일한 담보로서의 핵심적인 수단이기 때문이다. 북한이 핵 억지력을 이용하여 미국과 갈등을 유발하고자 하는 근본 목적이 여기에 있음을 알 수 있다.

북한은 국제적인 고립과 경제악화, 미국의 위협 등 총체적인 안보불안이 해소되지 않는 한 핵 프로그램을 포기하지 않을 것이다. 북한은 지난 60여 년 동안 핵무기를 개발하여 고도화 시켰고 요구되는 시간과 장소에 언제라도 사용할 태세가 완비되어있다고 호언하고 있다. 미국은 9·11테러 이후 테러와의 전쟁 선포, 대량살상무기 확산방지, 민주주의의 확산을 근본적인 외교안보전략으로 하고 있다. 이에 반하는 북한의 핵 개발을 좌시할 수 없기 때문에 미북 간 갈등과 대립이 유발되고 있다. 중국이나 러시아도 자국의 이익에 부합되지 않음으로 인하여 북한의 핵 억지력 개발에 대해 반대를 표명하고 있다. 미국은 북한이 지금과 같은 갈등을 유발하고 9·19공동선언과 2·13합의를 무효화 시키는 행위를 지속한다면 국제사회의 협력과 공조, 또는 군사력을 이용하여 정권을 교체할 수도 있다.

북한의 핵 억지력 문제를 해결하는 것이야 말로 대한민국의 안보위협을 해소하고 핵심 국익을 증진할 수 있는 지름길이다. 북한이 개혁·개방을 추구한다면 북한을 국제사회의 일원으로 인정하고 정치적·경제적 측면에서 북한이 정상국가로 나아갈 수 있도록 적극적인 지원에 대한 약속이 이행될 것이다. 남북관계에 있어서도 7·4공동성명에서 합의한 ‘자주·평화·민족대단결’의 3대원칙에 대한 약속을 준수한다면 한반도의 평화적 통일을 달성할 수 있는 기반이 제공될 것이다.
Alternative Title
A Study on the North Korea’s Reverse-Coercion Strategy against Powerful Nations : Focusing on DPRK’s Nuclear Issue
Alternative Author(s)
Jeong, Jong Kwan
Affiliation
조선대학교
Department
일반대학원 정치외교학과
Advisor
오수열
Awarded Date
2016-08
Table Of Contents
표 목 차 ················································································· ⅳ
그림목차 ················································································· ⅴ
ABSTRACT ············································································ ⅵ
제 1장 서 론 ······································································ 1
제1절 연구의 목적 ····························································· 1
제2절 연구의 방법 및 범위 ··············································· 5
제 2장 이론적 고찰 및 분석틀 ··········································· 10
제1절 약소국 외교정책의 주요이론 ······························ 10
1. 동맹이론 ····································································· 12
2. 편승이론 ···································································· 16
3. 세력균형이론 ···························································· 20
제2절 강압이론 ··································································· 24
1. 강압의 개념 ······························································· 25
2. 강압의 수단 ······························································· 28
3. 강압의 성공조건 ······················································· 32
제3절 기존 연구의 검토 ····················································· 38
제4절 분석의 틀 ·································································· 43
제 3장 북한의 핵 개발 배경 및 목적 ·································· 48
제1절 북한의 핵 개발 배경 ················································ 48
1. 6·25 전쟁 ····································································· 48
2. 이라크 사태 ································································ 51
3. 리비아 사태 ································································ 52
4. 우크라이나 사태 ························································ 53
제2절 북한의 핵 보유 목적 및 능력 ·································· 54
1. 북한의 핵 보유 목적 ·················································· 54
2. 북한의 핵 능력 ··························································· 57
제 4장 미국의 대북 강압과 북한의 대응 ····························· 62
제1절 제1차 북 핵 위기 ······················································· 63
1. 미국의 대북 인식 ························································ 64
2. 미국의 대북 강압과 북한의 역강압 ························· 65
3. 북한의 대미 역강압 성공요인 ··································· 69
제2절 제2차 북 핵 위기 ·························································73
1. 미국의 대북 인식 ·························································· 74
2. 미국의 대북 강압과 북한의 역강압 ··························· 77
3. 북한의 대미 역강압 성공요인 ····································· 93
제3절 제2차 북 핵 위기 이후 ··············································· 97
1. 미국의 대북 인식 ··························································100
2. 미국의 대북 강압과 북한의 역강압 ···························102
3. 북한의 대미 역강압 성공요인 ····································115
제4절 소 결 론 ·····································································118
제 5장 한국 안보에 대한 함의와 대응전략 ·························122
제1절 한국 안보에 대한 함의 ·············································122
1. 한미동맹의 이완 ··························································124
2. 안보위협 가중 ······························································126
3. 자주권 훼손 ··································································128
제2절 한국의 대응전략 ·······················································129
1. 공포의 균형 전략 ·························································130
2. 선제공격에 대한 신뢰성과 의사소통의 확보 ···········133
3. 북한 비핵화를 위한 대안 제시 ···································134
4. 중국과 전략적 협력강화 ··············································136
제 6장 결 론 ···········································································140
참고문헌 ······················································································143
부 록
1. 북 핵 일지(1955~2014) ·············································· 154
Degree
Doctor
Publisher
조선대학교
Citation
정종관. (2016). 강대국에 대한 약소국의 역강압전략에 관한 연구 : 북핵 문제를 중심으로.
Type
Dissertation
URI
https://oak.chosun.ac.kr/handle/2020.oak/12873
http://chosun.dcollection.net/common/orgView/200000265635
Appears in Collections:
General Graduate School > 4. Theses(Ph.D)
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