

The United Nations Humanitarian Interventions: Selected Humanitarian Crisis in 1989-2014:

Why Do Some Humanitarian Crisis Cases Not Experience UN Humanitarian Intervention?

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논문요약

The United Nations developed the concept of humanitarian intervention/R2P (Responsibility to Protect) and deployed PKOs (Peace Keeping Operations) to protect civilians from the dangers of humanitarian crisis like massacre and genocide. Peacekeeping operations are recognized as effective tools to protect human life. However, of the 831 humanitarian crises that occurred in the period 1989-2014, only 237 (28.51%) were subjects of UN PKO deployment. What determinants influence the deployment of UN PKO for protecting human life? I posit three determinants that impact the likelihood of the UN's humanitarian intervention: the interests of power nations, characteristics of target nations, and objects of humanitarian intervention. In a quantitative empirical analysis of the UN's deployment of PKOs between 1989-2014, I find that humanitarian crises are selected depending on target nations' economic/political value. Specifically, the economic interests of power nations, target nations' characteristics such as military power, GDP, population, and democratic system influence the UN's humanitarian intervention. The number of deaths in a humanitarian crisis does not influence the UN's humanitarian intervention. These results show the true face of international governance on humanitarian intervention.

Keywords : Humanitarian Intervention, PKOs, Economic Interests, Humanitarian Crisis

I. Introduction

When a humanitarian crisis happens, the world condemns the target nation. To protect the people/ethnic group in danger of genocide, the United Nations (UN) deploys PKO (Peace Keeping Operation) troops. This action has attracted scholarly attention and controversy. In the Charter of the UN, each nation's sovereignty is respected and no authority can infringe on it. However, when a humanitarian crisis such as genocide happens and the country in which it occurs cannot solve the conflict or protect the people/ethnic group or when the government itself is committing genocide, the UN deploys the PKO to the target nations where the humanitarian crisis occurs. From the 1980s to now, there have been many humanitarian crises, genocides, and many people killed. However, the UN deployed PKO troops to protect the people only sometimes. What determinants influence the UN to deploy PKO for protecting lives in the name of humanitarian intervention?

Despite the importance of the topic, previous researchers have not focused on UN PKO actions and have not offered empirical evidence. This paper offers a quantitative analysis of the UN's humanitarian intervention covering the time period 1989–2014.

I contend that three determinants impact the likelihood of the UN's humanitarian intervention when a humanitarian crisis happens. The first aspect is the interests of the power nations. The UN's humanitarian intervention is decided on by the UN Security Council, which consists of power nations including five permanent member nations (i.e., the U.S., Russia, France, China, and the U.K) and 10 non-permanent member

nations. Power nations more often want to deploy the UN PKO to target nations that have economic value from the humanitarian crisis. In a humanitarian crisis, power nations' economic investment will be damaged. Thus, the UN's humanitarian intervention will be more likely to occur in target nations that have much FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). In addition, when the target nations have democratic governments, the UN is more likely to deploy PKO for humanitarian intervention because democratic system is common value of world. Thus, it has political value from the humanitarian crisis.

The second aspect is the characteristics of target nations. In terms of the UN's PKO, target nations' consent should be needed. When a humanitarian crisis happens in a strong power nation, the likelihood of the UN's humanitarian intervention will decrease. There are many measurements of a nation's power but generally, military power, GDP, and population impact on the UN's humanitarian intervention on target nations.

The third aspect is the object of the humanitarian intervention. The number one reason for the UN's humanitarian intervention is to protect human life from the humanitarian crisis. However, in practice, the number of deaths by genocide and the range of the humanitarian crisis do not influence the likelihood of a humanitarian intervention. This is an irony of the UN's humanitarian intervention. Thus, I refer to whether the UN intervention as the selective humanitarian intervention.

II. Humanitarian Intervention

1. Cases of selective humanitarian intervention

On April 5, 1991, the Iraqi government began a massacre against the Kurds. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688 by a vote of 10–3 with 2 abstentions. Within weeks of the passage of Resolution 688, 13 nations had sent 30,000 military and civilian personnel to participate in the relief mission. In particular, U.S. forces deployed 18,285 military troops to Iraq.

On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda was killed when his airplane was shot down by an unknown actor. Hutus were suspected of this killing, but they blamed the attack on the Tutsis, who are a minority that constitutes only fifteen percent of the population in Rwanda. Hutu militiamen began slaughtering innocent Tutsis and some Hutus who had a friendly attitude to Tutsis. On May 31, 1994, the UN Security Council estimated that 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandans had been killed. On June 22, 1994, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 929 that authorized France to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians in the violent civil war in Rwanda. Although 2700 UN observers were already stationed in Rwanda in the name of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to monitor a peace settlement, it did not work to prevent the humanitarian crisis. The United Nations decided to increase the number of troops to Rwanda by 5500.

As we see the examples of the UN PKO’s humanitarian intervention, some humanitarian crises make the United Nations deploy troops while

others do not. Previous United Nations' humanitarian intervention were deployed in Rwanda, Iraq, and Somalia, whereas humanitarian crises in China, Bangladesh, and Turkey were ignored and thousands of innocent people were killed. What makes the UN deploy troops in some humanitarian crisis but not others? Answers to this question will give scholars and policy makers with insight into attaining world peace.

<Table 1> The United Nations' PKO deployment in humanitarian crisis, 1989-2014¹⁾

Operation	Duration	Place
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	Dec 1989 – Jun 1991	Angola
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	May 1991 – Feb 1995	Angola
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	Feb 1995 – Jun 1997	Angola
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	May 1994 – Jun 1994	Libya
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Oct 1993 – Mar 1996	Rwanda
United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)	May 2003 – Apr 2004	Côte d'Ivoire
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Jul 2000 – Jul 2008	Ethiopia and Eritrea
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Oct 1999 – Dec 2005	Sierra Leone
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	Mar 1998 – Feb 2000	the Central African Republic
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	Sep 2007 – Dec 2010	the Central African Republic and Chad
United Nations Observer Mission in	Jun 1997 – Feb 1999	Angola

1) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations>(Search Date:2020.10.10.).

Operation	Duration	Place
Angola (MONUA)		
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Sep 1993 - Sep 1997	Liberia
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Jul 1998 - Oct 1999	Sierra Leone
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda - Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Jun 1993 - Sep 1994	Uganda - Rwanda
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	May 2004 - Dec 2006	Burundi
United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Apr 2004 - Jun 2017	Côte d'Ivoire
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Dec 1992 - Dec 1994	Mozambique
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	Apr 1992 - Mar 1993	Somalia
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	Mar 1993 - Mar 1995	Somalia
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	Mar 2005 - Jul 2011	Sudan
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	Nov 1999 - Jun 2010	the Democratic Republic of the Congo
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Apr 1989 - Mar 1990	Namibia
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)	Nov 1997 - Mar 2000	Haiti
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	Sep 1993 - Jun 1996	Haiti
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	Nov 1989 - Jan 1992	Central America
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	May 1991 - Apr 1995	El Salvador
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)	Jun 1996 - Jul 1997	Haiti
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)	Jul 1997 - Nov 1997	Haiti

Operation	Duration	Place
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	Jan 1997 – May 1997	Guatemala
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	Oct 1991 – Mar 1992	Cambodia
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)	Dec 1994 – May 2000	Tajikistan
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)	May 2002 – May 2005	East Timor
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	Oct 1999 – May 2002	East Timor
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Feb 1992 – Sep 1993	Cambodia
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor – Leste (UNMIT)	Aug 2006 – Dec 2012	Timor – Leste
United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG)	Jan 1998 – Oct 1998	Croatia
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO)	Mar 1995 – Jan 1996	Croatia
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)	Dec 1995 – Dec 2002	Bosnia and Herzegovina
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)	Feb 1996 – Dec 2002	Prevlaka peninsula
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	Aug 1993 – Jun 2009	Georgia
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)	Mar 1995 – Feb 1999	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Feb 1992 – Mar 1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)	Jan 1996 – Jan 1998	Croatia
United Nations Iraq – Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	Apr 1991 – Oct 2003	Kuwait
United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)	Apr 2012 – Aug 2012	Syria

III. Review of Literature

Some researchers have tried to find the determinants of the United Nations' deployment of peacekeeping operations.²⁾ The literature generally falls in several aspects: (1) national interests of strong power nations, (2) characteristics of target nations, and (3) characteristics of the mission itself.

1. National Interests of strong power nations

Some scholars suggest that major powers have an interest in peacekeeping missions and can bear the cost of UN PKO mission,³⁾ arguing that strong power nations' national interests impact the United Nations' peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers go where the permanent members of the Security Council or especially the United States have important national interests.⁴⁾ Because few nations pay for the United Nations' mission costs, national interests can be considered motivations for where the United Nations deploy PKO.⁵⁾ Among these interests, economic

2) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003, pp. 37-54; Fortna, VP, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, pp. 269-292; Fortna, VP, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004; Mullenbach, M., "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2005, pp. 529-556; Doyle, MW. and Sambanis, N, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; Fortna, VP, *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents's Choices after Civil War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

3) Durch, WJ, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993; Mingst, K, "Troubled Waters: The United States-United Nations Relationship." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2003, pp. 82-93.

4) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?", pp. 37-54.

5) Mingst, K., "Troubled Waters: The United States-United Nations Relationship.", pp. 82-93.

interest has a crucial influence on decision-making over matters of war and peace.⁶⁾ Stojek and Tir ⁷⁾ explored the role of economic self-interest in UN PKO authorizations, alongside established humanitarian and security factors. They found that where UN PKOs are deployed and the distribution of financial contributions are influenced by the economic interests of P5 states.

An extreme argument is that peacekeeping is imperialism in disguise and that peacekeepers are deployed where the strong powers have an economic interest in access to raw materials and primary commodities.⁸⁾ The UN's decision making is subordinate to the interests of most notably the powerful states among its membership and key PKO authorization decisions are often the prerogative of those countries.

Peacekeeping operations need significant costs of budget and voluntary troops from member nations, and these costs are supported by a relatively small group of states.⁹⁾ For example, main contributors like the USA, China, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Russia, and Canada support 80.52% of the UN's PKO costs; the top three nations (the USA, China, and Japan) paid 52% of PKO expenditures. ¹⁰⁾

These less enough budget and troop mean that the UN's PKO

6) Hegre, H., Oneal JR and Russett B., "Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 6, 2010, pp. 763–774.

7) Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States." *European Journal of International Relations*, 2014, pp. 1–25.

8) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?", pp. 37–54.

9) Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States.", pp. 1–25.

10) Coleman, P. Katharina, "United Nations Peacekeeping Decisions: Three Hierarchies, Upward Mobility and Institutionalised Inequality among Member States." *Global Society*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2020, p. 326.

decision-making is impacted by the member states' interests. Similarly, the main contributors had significant impacts on PKO decisions. ¹¹⁾

Some scholars argue that peacekeeping since the 1990s aims to build democracy¹²⁾ because the great powers have an interest in increasing the number of democracies in the world.¹³⁾ Andersson ¹⁴⁾ argues that where the UN chooses to go is not influenced by any permanent member's direct interest but by a desire to promote democracy in the world. He argues that this motivation is an idealistic interest of the permanent members because, according to the democratic peace theory, the democratic nations do not fight each other, thus, the permanent members should desire to increase the number of democracies in the world. However, Gilligan and Stedman ¹⁵⁾ mention that it is not clear why nondemocratic nations like China and Russia consent to the United Nations' PKO deployment aimed primarily at promoting democracy.

Other scholars argue differently. In the post-Cold war era, democratic regimes are 19% less likely to be targets of peacekeeping missions than nondemocratic nations.

This is consistent with arguments that democratic regimes rely on their own institutions to manage post-civil war tensions.¹⁶⁾

11) Coleman, P. Katharina, Ibid.

12) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?", pp. 37-54.

13) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., Ibid.

14) Andersson, Andreas, "Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, 2000, pp. 1-22.

15) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?", pp. 37-54.

16) Aydin, A. "Where Do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2010, pp. 47-66; Fortna, VP, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.", pp. 269-292; Shelton, A. M., Stojek S. M. and Sullivan, P. L., "What Do We Know About Civil War Outcomes." *International Studies Review*, Vol. 15 No. 4, 2013, pp. 515-538.

2. Characteristics of Target nations

Some scholars argue that after examining where and when the UN has deployed PKOs and where it has not, they found that the UN acts in corroborating between humanitarian and security purpose but there was distinct bias toward conflict in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.¹⁷⁾ Furthermore, the United Nations' PKO deployments are affected by considerations of power, cost, and risk. Gilligan and Stedman ¹⁸⁾ provide evidence that the United Nations responds to civil wars in weaker states more than in stronger states, considering the size of the target nation's army. If the permanent members are the target nations where civil war or secessionist movements are taking place (i.e., China and Russia), the permanent members are less willing to intervene in conflicts.¹⁹⁾

Some scholars focus on the characteristics of the nation experiencing a civil war, suggesting that the UN is more likely to deploy PKO to target nations that have rich extractable resources such as oil.²⁰⁾ However, there is little empirical evidence for this.²¹⁾ Furthermore, strong power nations with strong governments and militaries and large economies are less likely

17) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do Peacekeepers Go?", pp. 37–54.

18) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., Ibid.

19) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., Ibid.

20) Doyle, M. W. and Sambanis N., "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, 2000, pp. 779–801; Ross, M. L., "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2004, pp. 33–356.

21) Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States.", pp. 1–25.

to be the targets of UN PKO intervention because these strong nations can resolve their own internal disputes.²²⁾ In terms of PKO deployment, strong countervailing power prevents the UN's intervention on humanitarian crisis. For example, the Sudanese government resisted the UN's action. ²³⁾

In addition, major power nations prefer to be free of any international intervention. That is, these nations are unlikely to allow outsiders to intervene in their domestic affairs,²⁴⁾ especially when the UN tries to replace their central authority.²⁵⁾

With this logic, PKOs are more likely to be sent to weaker nations with weaker militaries and poor economic capabilities when they experience humanitarian crisis. However, whether the regime type will impact on receiving the United Nations PKO has not been proved.²⁶⁾

In addition, some scholars argue that a shared colonial history does not increase PKO deployment.²⁷⁾ But some scholars find no relationship

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- 22) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?", pp. 37-54; Mullenbach, M., "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.", pp. 529-556; Walter, B., "Bargaining Failures and Civil War." *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 12, 2009, pp. 243-261; Aydin, A., "Where Do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention.", pp. 47-66; Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States.", pp. 1-25.
- 23) Binder, Martin, *The United Nations and the Politics of Selective Humanitarian Interventions*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 42-44.
- 24) Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States.", pp. 1-25.
- 25) Dorussen, Han and Andrea, Ruggeri, "Peacekeeping Event Data: Determining the Place and Space of Peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping*, 2017, p. 8.
- 26) Fortna, VP, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.", pp. 269-292; Perkins, R. and Neumayer E., "Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces: Explaining the Geographies of post-Cold War Peacekeeping." *Political Geography*, Vol. 27, No. 8, 2008, pp. 895-914.
- 27) Fortna, VP, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." pp. 269-292; Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where do the peacekeepers go?", pp. 37-54.

between the security alignment or political affinity between the P5 and the civil war state on the United Nations' PKO decision.²⁸⁾

3. Characteristics of the PKO Mission

There is an argument that the UN is more likely to deploy PKO in cases where peace is relatively difficult to maintain and there has been indecisive military victory. Fortna ²⁹⁾ found that peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed to more difficult missions, rather than to relatively easy cases. In addition, the more indecisive the military outcome, the more likely it is that peacekeepers will be deployed. In addition, PKOs are more likely to be deployed to areas with a long history of conflict, and when great powers did not exercise their own veto in the Security Council. Mullenbach ³⁰⁾ argues that when a major power intervenes in a civil war, the UN is less likely to deploy PKOs.³¹⁾

Some scholars argue that the United Nations choose relatively difficult missions. For example, the United Nations are more likely to deploy PKO to high-casualty³²⁾ or long-lasting conflicts.³³⁾ Stojek and Tir ³⁴⁾ assume

28) Fortna, VP, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.", pp. 269–292; Perkins, R. and Neumayer E., "Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces: Explaining the Geographies of post-Cold War Peacekeeping.", pp. 895–914.

29) Fortna, VP, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.", pp. 269–292.

30) Mullenbach, M., "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.", pp. 529–556

31) Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, "The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States.", pp. 1–25.

32) Aydin, A., "Where Do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention.", pp. 47–66; Fortna, VP, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.", pp. 269–292; Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?", pp. 37–54; Bove, V. and Elia, L., "Supplying Peace: Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 48, No. 6, 2011, pp. 699–714.

that humanitarian motives lead the United Nations to deploy PKO more to stop deadly conflicts. How the civil war ended is also parameter of whether a PKO is an easy mission or difficult mission. When the civil war ends in victory, after the war ends, it seems that the winning party can resolve the after-war situation by themselves and the defeated side accepts the military outcome with less intervention from the United Nations. These are the “easy” cases.

In contrast, when victory is unclear, a negotiated civil war settlement makes the situation more complex and difficult, requiring PKO intervention.³⁵⁾ Some scholars find that conflict-ending formal agreements are more likely to increase the chances that there will be PKO deployment.³⁶⁾ However, Gilligan and Stedman³⁷⁾ find no significant effect of formal ceasefire treaties on UN intervention. This is, whether the conflict is easy or difficult does not impact the deployment of the United Nations’ PKO.

Some scholars argue that the first reason of the United Nations’ PKO is to uphold peace and security. First normative motivation of the UN PKO deployment is for humanitarian purpose. Jacobsen³⁸⁾ argues that national interest is not essential for United Nations intervention, but CNN effect is real factor the United Nations deploy PKO for protecting human. He

33) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”, pp. 37-54.

34) Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States.”, pp. 1-25.

35) Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, Ibid.

36) Perkins, R. and Neumayer, E., “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces: Explaining the Geographies of post-Cold War Peacekeeping.”, pp. 895-914; Mullenbach, M., “Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.”, pp. 529-556; Fortna, VP, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.”, pp. 269-292.

37) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”, pp. 37-54.

38) Jacobsen, Peter Viggo, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, 1996, pp. 205-215.

examined the impact of five explanatory factors in five peace enforcement missions. He found two facts that one is intervention is driven by self-interests and by humanitarian sentiment precipitated by massive humanitarian crisis. Beardsley and Schmidt ³⁹⁾ argue that the UN's aim for PKO deployment is the common good.

The previous literature of the UN intervention suggests that the influence of self-interest of major powers in deciding PKO deployment is larger but PKO decisions are also driven by the larger public goods of security and humanitarian considerations.⁴⁰⁾ Sojek and Tir ⁴¹⁾ found that the deadliness of a civil war had a consistently positive impact on the probability that the United Nations would offer PKO assistance. This is similar to the argument that peacekeepers are deployed to resolve “hard” cases.⁴²⁾ In terms of the aim of the United Nations' intervention regarding humanitarian purposes, there are two different arguments. The first is that UN intervention is influenced by the number of deaths in a conflict, and the second is that the United Nations put a distinction for deploying the PKO for the deaths occurs in Europe than in Africa, and in Africa than in Asia.⁴³⁾

39) Beardsley, Kyle and Schmidt, Holger, “Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945–2002.”, pp. 33–49.

40) Sojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-led Deployments to Civil War States.”, pp. 1–25.

41) Sojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav, *Ibid.*

42) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”, pp. 37–54; Fortna, VP, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.”, pp. 269–292; Perkins, R. and Neumayer, E., “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces: Explaining the Geographies of post-Cold War Peacekeeping.”, pp. 895–914.

43) Gilligan, M. and Stedman, S. J., “Where do the peacekeepers go?”, pp. 37–54.

IV. Theory and Hypotheses

Some humanitarian crises in certain nations are more sympathetic than others in other nations. Which determinant impact on the United Nations' humanitarian intervention?

Previous research did not distinguish between the PKOs deployment and UN's collective security. In this study, I focus on the UN PKO and its humanitarian intervention. Previous researchers have also focused on the interests of the 5 permanent nations in the Security Council that influence the likelihood of PKO deployment in civil wars.

However, other nations can participate in the process of decision making for PKO deployment in the Security Council. In order to pass the agenda in the Security Council, more than 9 of the 15 member nations must vote yes. Thus, non-permanent nations' interests should be considered in a study of UN PKO deployment decisions. In my research, I include all states' economic interests that influence the likelihood of PKO deployment for humanitarian interventions. Previous literature mentions permanent members' national interests, but I will use all nations' FDI as economic interests. As FDI are increased, world wants to save and protect humanitarian crisis in target nations that received a FDI.

Over the last decade, there has been a growing scholarly interest in humanitarian intervention. An estimate of one-sided violence fatality between 1989–2004 is 572,767.⁴⁴⁾ Accordingly, the prevention of genocide has taken on increased salience in both policymaking and academic circles.

44) Eck, Kristine and Hultman, Lisa, "One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2007, pp. 233–246.

In its efforts to find effective solutions to genocide, the UN carries out humanitarian interventions using PKOs. However, some genocide cases did not receive humanitarian intervention by PKOs after the Cold War.

In this paper, I find that only 28.51% of post-Cold War humanitarian crises experienced UN PKO humanitarian intervention (Schubiger, 2019, *The Ethnic One-Sided Violence Dataset, EOSV*).⁴⁵⁾ Walter ⁴⁶⁾ argues that attracting outside assistance like UN PKO intervention is not equal in all countries. For example, when the Chinese government committed genocide in 1989, the UN did not deploy troops. But, in certain area, the UN deployed more often. What are the reasons for this difference?

The purpose of the United Nations' humanitarian intervention is simply to protect individuals from the humanitarian crisis, but, in reality there are lots of issues the United Nations should handle and there are limitation of the capacities and budgets, military troops in which the United Nations can use. It means that the stated purpose is to protect human life, but in reality, there are other considerations besides human life. When a humanitarian crisis happens such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, the United Nations, especially the Security Council sets the agenda and decides whether to deploy PKO to the target nation in a humanitarian intervention.

1. The interests of the power nations

The first aspect that influences the United Nations' humanitarian intervention is the interests of the member nations of the Security Council

45) Schubiger, *The Ethnic One-Sided Violence Dataset, EOSV*, 2019.

46) Walter, B., "Bargaining Failures and Civil War.", pp. 243–261.

including all permanent and non-permanent nations. The members of the Security Council consider economic value of target nations' humanity. The world's economies are connected to each other, and if one area has an economic crisis, it will spread to the whole world. In addition, many countries invest money in other nations through foreign direct investment (FDI). When a humanitarian crisis happens, it makes the target nation's economic and political situation unstable and further leads to loss of investor nations' economic investment. Thus, the investors want the humanitarian crisis to end as soon as possible. With this logic, if other nations have invested in the target nation, the UN is more likely to deploy PKO to protect citizens through humanitarian intervention. The preceding discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: When a humanitarian crisis occurs in a country where the power nations' economic interest is higher, the likelihood of a United Nations humanitarian intervention will increase.

2. Characteristics of target nations

The second aspect that influences the UN's humanitarian intervention is the characteristics of target nations.

I posit that the weaker the target nation, the more likely the UN is to deploy PKO. For the purposes of this study, the characteristics of the nations are military power, economy, and population. When a humanitarian crisis happens in a target nation which has a strong military capability, higher GDP, and high population, the UN is less likely to

deploy PKO for humanitarian intervention. For the target nations, the United Nations' deployment PKO is challenging toward the its own nation's sovereignty. Thus, the target nations usually do not want to consent the United Nations' humanitarian intervention on its territory. However, when a humanitarian crisis happens in a target nation whose military and economy ability is weak and population is small level, it is relatively easy to deploy PKO to protect human life. Thus, the United Nations are more likely to deploy PKO for humanitarian intervention in weaker nations:

Hypothesis 2: When a humanitarian crisis happens in weaker nations, the likelihood of the United Nations' humanitarian intervention will increase.

Another characteristic of the target nation that influences the UN's humanitarian intervention is its system of governance. After the Cold War era, many nations changed their political system to democracies and of course there are still non-democracies system in the world. However, the countries that we call "developed countries or advanced countries" have democratic systems and this system has become the mainstream political system in the world. As we experienced, the democratic wave is still ongoing. Democratic systems prioritize the value of human rights. Relatively fewer humanitarian crises happen in democratic nations and relatively many in non-democratic nations. The United Nations are filled with justice, human right, democracy, even if there are still lots of non-democratic nations but general political system the human kind admits

it as a desirable value. The United Nations values human rights in all systems, whether they be democratic or non-democratic. However, the UN tends to deploy the PKO to protect people in humanitarian crisis in democratic nations rather than non-democratic nations because the failed protection on human in democratic nations means failed democratic governance of United Nations. Meanwhile failed protection in non-democratic nations is more common thus, for the United Nations, it is less burden to protect the people in the humanitarian crisis. For the world, the values of democracy are considered essential and it should be kept and protected.

In addition, democratic countries are more attractive targets for humanitarian intervention because in the democratic countries, human rights are more valued but in non-democratic countries, human rights are easily disregarded. Thus, the UN can more easily get consent for intervention from democratic countries than non-democratic countries or democratic nations are more valuable to be protected compared to the non-democratic countries. The United Nations wants to protect democratic nations that experience the humanitarian crisis. The following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: When a humanitarian crisis happens in a democratic nation, the likelihood of a UN humanitarian intervention will increase.

3. Number of deaths

The third aspect that influences the UN's humanitarian intervention is the number of deaths in a humanitarian crisis. The fundamental reason for the United Nations' humanitarian intervention is literally to protect human rights. From the ideological perspective, the United Nations consider the world peace without any realistic considerations. Thus, I posit that when casualties driven by a humanitarian crisis such as genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing are larger, the UN is more likely to deploy PKO to protect human life:

Hypothesis 4: When the humanitarian crisis happens and the number of death becomes larger, the likelihood of the United Nations' humanitarian intervention will increase.

V. Research Design

1. Data

In order to test the preceding hypotheses regarding the United Nations' humanitarian intervention, 831 humanitarian crises occurring over the period 1989 – 2014 were identified. Unlike previous studies that usually focused on intervention in civil wars, I focus on the humanitarian intervention deploying UN PKO in the target nations where the humanitarian crisis happens. Of the 831 humanitarian crises, 237 were subjects of UN PKO deployment to protect human life (28.51 %); 594

(71.47%) humanitarian crisis cases did not attract UN humanitarian intervention. In order to analyze the United Nations' humanitarian intervention on the humanitarian crisis, I chose genocide among humanitarian crisis. I use Schubiger's Ethnic One-Sided Violence (EOSV) dataset,⁴⁷⁾ which provides information about the ethnic identity of the victims of deliberate attacks from governments, other ethnic groups, or armed groups.

2. Dependent Variables

To code my dependent variable — UN humanitarian intervention — I use United Nations Peacekeeping data (<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>).⁴⁸⁾ When a humanitarian crisis happens, the United Nations decide to deploy the PKO or not. There are two ways PKO can be deployed.

The first is that when the United Nations deploys PKO troops to the target nation after a humanitarian crisis begins. The second is when the PKO troops are already deployed in the target nation for another purpose when the humanitarian crisis happens. For the purpose of this paper, I operationalize the United Nations' humanitarian intervention as when a humanitarian crisis happens, the United Nations Peacekeepers are already in the target nation or are sent there after the humanitarian crisis happens. Based on these considerations, the dependent variable is coded as “1” if the United Nations deployed PKO for humanitarian intervention and “0” otherwise.

47) Schubiger, *The Ethnic One-Sided Violence Dataset, EOSV*, 2019.

48) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>(Search Data:2020.10.10.).

3. Main Independent Variables

To operationalize the economic interests of the power nations, I use foreign direct investment in US dollars in the target nations. I focus on the FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) because it represents the world's economic evaluation of certain nations. Large FDI means that the world regards a target nation as having high economic value. I use FDI data from the World Bank that include the entire FDI amount in the target nations but do not separate P5 or other members of the UN Security Council. FDI represents the world's economic value in the target nations.

In a follow-up analysis, I also examine whether the target nation's characteristics such as military, economic capabilities, population, and democratic system influence the United Nations' humanitarian intervention.

Military power — I measure the number of total armed forces personnel in the target nation. Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. The data source is *International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance*.

GDP — I measure the GDP (gross domestic product) in the target nation at the year of the humanitarian crisis happened using data from *The World Bank*.

Population — I measure *population* in the target nations at the year of the humanitarian crisis happened using data from *The World Bank*.

Democracy — I measure the extent of *democracy* in the target nations when the humanitarian crisis happened using *The Polity IV Project*. This

data provides a single regime score that ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).

Deaths — I measure the number of *deaths* caused by the humanitarian crisis using data from the *Ethnic One-Sided Violence Dataset* (EOSV), which provides information about the ethnic identity of the victims of deliberate attacks from governments or ethnic groups or armed groups against noncombatants and ethnic groups.

4. Control Variables

I control for several factors that might influence the likelihood of the United Nations' humanitarian intervention in a humanitarian crisis.

Oil — Because the UN Security Council's members consider their economic interests in the decision to deploy PKO, I control for a target nation's oil rent of GDP. That is, for the UN's members, if the genocide happens in a target nation that has plenty of *oil* rent, the oil price will fluctuate and harm UN members' economic interests. Thus, to keep the price of oil stable, the UN will deploy PKO in target nations where there is plenty of oil rent. The data come from *The World Bank*.

Place — Another control variable that meets the aim of the UN humanitarian intervention is the number of *places* where the genocide happens. When genocide takes place over a wide area crossing countries, the likelihood of the UN PKO's deployment will increase due to the need to protect human life. The data come from the *EOSV*.

Genocide agent — If the genocide is carried out by the government, the target country will not want to consent to the UN's PKO deployment.

However, if the genocide is at the hands of non-government agents, the target country will want to consent. The variable *government-led* is coded as 1 if the genocide is executed by the government and 0 otherwise. The data come from the *EOSV*.

Land size — I control for *land size* of target nations where the humanitarian crisis happens because if the land size is larger, it is harder to cover in the effort to protect human life. The data come from *The World Bank*.

<Table 2> Summary Statistics, 1989-2014

Variables	Observations	Mean (SD)	Minimum	Maximum
UN Humanitarian Interventions	831	.285 (.451)	0	1
FDI	831	337451.8 (1400674)	-1017640	2.53e+07
Military Power	831	459680.4 (742845.6)	0	3900000
GDP	831	172939.5 (513627.1)	0	1.06e+07
Population	831	16934.72 (34194.94)	74.6817	1.32465.5
Democracy	831	1.807 (5.455)	-10	10
Death	831	1502.017 (27815.7)	25	800000
Oil	831	4.728 (10.886)	0	64.078
Place	831	1.158 (.437)	1	3
By Agent	831	.334 (.472)	0	1
Land Size	831	152.9288 (227.746)	0.076	1638.995

VI. Results and Discussion

Table 3 reports the empirical results of analyses of the influence of national interests, characteristics of the target nations, and the number of deaths on the United Nations' humanitarian intervention. The results are highly supportive of my hypotheses.

Model 1 (By all agent) confirms my expectation in Hypothesis 1. The FDI variable has a significant impact on the United Nations' humanitarian intervention. As one unit in the FDI increased, the odds of the United Nations' PKO deployment increased by 0.0001%. When the economic interest of nations is higher in the target nation, the likelihood of UN humanitarian intervention increase. This result implies that the members of the Security Council consider their economic interests when they decide to deploy PKO for humanitarian intervention.

Furthermore, the target nation's characteristics variables confirm my expectations in Hypothesis 2. When the target nation's military power is weaker, GDP is low, and population is low, the likelihood of UN humanitarian intervention increases. As one unit in military power increased, the odds of the United Nations' PKO deployment decreased by 0.1%. As one unit in GDP increased, the odds of the United Nations' PKO deployment decreased by 0.0011%. As one unit in population increased, the odds of the United Nations' PKO deployment decreased by 0.01%. These results indicate that when the United Nations decides to deploy PKO, it considers the power of the target nation. In a conflict between the humanitarian intervention and the target nation's sovereignty, the UN will tend to avoid confrontation with a strong nation, but will

intervene with a relatively easy (weaker) target.

The democracy variable also has significantly impact on the likelihood of UN humanitarian intervention. As expected in Hypothesis 3, when a humanitarian crisis happens in a democratic nation, the likelihood of a humanitarian intervention by the UN increases. As one unit in democracy increased, the odds of the United Nations' PKO deployment increased by 9%. This result indicates that the United Nations believes that democratic system in the world do not cause the humanitarian crisis thus democratic system has value for protect. For the world, democratic value is essential and it should be kept and protected. When the humanitarian crisis happens, the United Nations are more likely to deploy the PKO to protect the people under crisis in the democratic nations that experience the humanitarian crisis.

For example, 2006 Lebanon Crisis experienced the United Nations' humanitarian intervention to protect people in the danger. At that time, Lebanon was a highly democratized nation (Polity's democratic score was +6) Thus, even though there was a relatively low level of deaths, Lebanese civilians obtained protection from the UN.

Unlike the results of the economic interests and target nation's characteristics, the number of deaths in a humanitarian crisis has no impact on the UN's humanitarian intervention. This result belies the assertion that the UN's humanitarian interventions are motivated by the desire to protect human life. In reality, the United Nations considers other factors rather than human life itself.

The land size of the target nation has a significant impact on the likelihood of humanitarian intervention. As one unit in land size increased, the odds of the United Nations' PKO deployment increased by 0.3%.

Specifically, if the land size of the target nation where the humanitarian crisis happens is larger, the UN is more likely to deploy PKO. Meanwhile, the oil and place variables do not have an impact on UN humanitarian intervention. I wanted to show how agents (government or non-government carried genocide) influence the UN's PKO deployment in the humanitarian crisis. and I showed predicted Probability.

In Models 2 and 3, I classified cases into two groups: humanitarian crisis triggered by the government and by non-government actors, respectively. The results are similar to Model 1. In substantive terms, while holding other explanatory variables at their means, the predicted probability (marginal effect) of the United Nations' humanitarian intervention is +2.76% (by government), and +3.22 (by non-government). This means that, the probability of humanitarian intervention by the UN increases by 2.76% when the humanitarian crisis is carried out by the government and 3.22% when it is executed by non-government actors. This is because in order for the United Nations to deploy the PKO, consent from the target nations is needed but if the government committed the humanitarian crisis, it is more difficult to deploy the PKO than humanitarian crisis occurred by the non-government.

The reason why I only presented By Agent variables' Predicted Probability is that I wanted to show the conflict between the UN PKO deployment and individual countries' sovereignty.

<Table 3> Logistic analysis of UN humanitarian interventions, 1989-2014


Variables	By all agents (Model 1)	By government (Model 2)	By non-government (Model 3)	Predicted Probability	
FDI 1)	1.000** (3.20e-07)	1.000 (1.62e-06)	1.000 (4.10e-07)		
Military Power 2)	-.999* (7.18e-07)	1.000 (9.67e-07)	-.999*** (1.42e-06)		
GDP 3)	-.999*** (2.74e-06)	-.999 (5.24e-06)	-.999* (3.50e-12)		
Population	-.999* (.000)	-.999** (.000)	-.999 (.000)		
Democracy	1.090*** (0.022)	1.074*(.035)	1.120*** (0.341)		
Death 4)	1.000 (5.98e-06)	1.000 (.000)	-.999 (.000)		
Oil 5)	1.004(.008)	1.021 (.014)	1.004 (.011)		
Place	1.369 (.252)	2.382* (.908)	-.873 (.195)		
By Agent	-.853 (.153)			+2.76% (by governme nt)	+3.22% (by non-govern ment)
Land size 6)	1.003*** (.000)	1.000 (.001)	1.006*** (.001)		
Cons.	-.589** (.152)	-.245** (.108)	1.136 (.376)		
N	831	278	553		
Log Likelihood	-400.557	-147.533	-229.861		
Pseudo R2	0.193	0.125	0.299		

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

1), 3) FDI, GDP, Oil measured in US dollars

2), 4) Military Power, Death measured in individual number

〈Figure 1〉 Odds ratio graph



VII. Robustness Tests

I performed robustness checks with additional models. First, if the target nation shares a border with one of the P-5 member nations, the P-5 member nations will not want the United Nations to deploy the PKO in the target nations because the major power nations are unlikely to allow outsiders to intervene in their neighboring nations. To see whether target nations' proximity with P-5 member states influences PKO deployment for humanitarian intervention, I included a new variable in the PKO deployment model I set up in this paper and retested my model. The test results confirm previous findings that the economic interests of power

nations, target nations' characteristics such as military power, GDP, population, and democratic system influence the UN's humanitarian intervention.

Second, if the target nation is a former colony of a P-5 member nation, the P-5 member nations do not allow the United Nations deploy the PKO for humanitarian intervention because they take a special interest in former colonies. That is, they do not want outsiders to intervene in their former colony, even if it is the United Nations. To test for former colony effects, I replicate my model by adding colony variable. There are no significant changes in the results.

VIII. Conclusion

Since the United Nations initiated the concept of humanitarian intervention, several humanitarian crises have occurred, but some people in certain nations have not been protected by the United Nations. This article raises the question of why humanitarian intervention was applied differently. This is important topic for world peace but it has been relatively less studied.

I posit three aspects (determinants) that influence the likelihood of the UN's humanitarian intervention when a humanitarian crisis happens: the interests of the power nations, characteristics of target nations, and objects of humanitarian intervention. Empirical statistical findings show that power nations' economic interests (FDI) have a positive impact on humanitarian intervention, and democratic nations are more likely to experience humanitarian intervention. These are economic values. When a country has

high FDI and a high level of democracy, the likelihood of the UN's humanitarian intervention will increase.

The second aspect is the characteristics of target nations. Empirical evidence supports that when the UN decides to deploy PKO for humanitarian intervention, the weaker the nation is, the more likely it is that the UN will deploy PKO there. In a confrontation between the humanitarian intervention and the target nation's sovereignty, the UN tends to avoid confrontation with the strong power nation but will choose the relatively easy (weaker) target for humanitarian intervention.

Ironically, the number of deaths in the humanitarian crisis does not influence the UN's humanitarian intervention. This is opposed to the UN's aim of humanitarian intervention: protecting human lives in danger of massacre or genocide. However, the current analysis shows that the number of deaths is less considered when the UN decides on deploying PKO.

For the future research, who is the victim of the humanitarian crisis should be studied more thoroughly. When the victim does not have economic/political value, the United Nations would not protect them. But the victim, otherwise, has a economic/political value, the United Nations will protect them and for the next research, the length of the humanitarian intervention should be added. Because if the humanitarian intervention length is long, the world should pay attention to this crisis.

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논문요약

유엔 인도주의적 개입, 선택된 인도주의적 위기 1989-2014: 왜 몇몇 인도주의적 위기 사례는 유엔의 인도주의적 개입으로부터 외면당하는가?

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이 연구는 유엔의 인도주의적 개입에 대한 의문을 제기한다. 유엔은 인도주의적 개입(Humanitarian Intervention)과 보호책임(R2P, Responsibility to Protect)이라는 개념을 도입하여 인종청소, 대량학살과 같은 인도주의적 위기에 처한 일반 시민을 보호하기 위해 유엔평화유지군을 파병하였다. 유엔평화유지군은 인권을 보호하는 효율적인 수단으로 인식된다. 하지만, 전 세계적으로 발생한 1989-2014년의 831개의 인도주의적 위기 중 단지 28.51%의 위기만이 유엔으로부터 보호를 받았다. 반면 594개(71.47%)의 인도주의적 위기는 유엔으로부터 보호를 받지 못했다. 어떤 결정 요인이 인간보호를 위한 유엔의 인도주의적 개입에 영향을 미치는가? 본 연구에서는 유엔의 개입에 영향을 미치는 3가지 요인을 상정한다. 이는 강대국의 이익, 유엔 평화유지군이 파병되는 목적지 국가의 특징, 그리고 인도주의적 개입의 목적이다. 1989-2014년 사이의 유엔 평화유지군의 파병에 대한 양적, 경험적 분석에서 유엔의 인도주의적 개입은 파병의 목적지 국가의 특징에 따라 선택적으로 이루어진다고 밝혀졌다. 특히, 강대국의 경제적 이익, 파병의 목적지 국가의 특징(군사력, GDP, 인구수), 그리고 민주주의 체제가 유엔의 인도주의적 개입에 영향을 미친다. 역설적으로 인도주의적 위기에 따른 사망자수는 유엔의 파병에 영향을 미치지 않게 나타났다. 이러한 연구 결과는 인도주의적 개입에 대한 국제거버넌스의 진정한 모습을 보여준다.

주제어: 인도주의적 개입, 유엔 평화유지활동, 경제적 이익, 인도주의적 위기

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